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"OIL, GAS, AND OTHER MINERALS"
CLAUSES IN TEXAS: WHO'S ON FIRST?
by
Laura H. Burney*

Abbott:
Costello:
Abbott:

You know the names of the guys on the baseball team?
Go ahead. Who's on first base?
Who.
The guy playing first base.
Who is on first.

Costello:

What are you asking me for? ...

Abbott:
Costello:
Abbott:
Costello:
Abbott:
Costello:
Abbott:
Costello:
Abbott:
Costello:

the guy's name on first base?
No, What's on second.
I'm not askin' you who's on second.
Who is on first.
One base at a time now! ....
Who is on first.
I don't know.
He's on third.
How could I get on third base?
You mentioned his name.
I mentioned his name! I dunno anybody's name on this
team. How could I mention the guy's name? .... I

Costello:

I'm asking ya, what's

EGAL scholars have frequently turned to nonlegal sources, not for
their precedential value, but for comparison, explanation, and enlightenment. 2 This source proves to be relevant once again in analyzing the current state of the law on "oil, gas, and other minerals" clauses in
Texas. The following sarcastic, but accurate summary of Texas law by Justice C. L. Ray in Schwarz v. State3 is reminiscent of the confused tone in
Abbott and Costello's dialogue:
[T]he surface belongs to the surface estate owner and the minerals belong to the mineral estate owner, except in pre-June 8, 1983 severances
where nobody knows who owns what (not even a title examiner) until
*B.A.,

Trinity University; J.D., St. Mary's School of Law. Assistant Professor of Law,

St. Mary's School of Law.
1. Video Tape, "Hey Abbott," Video-America.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 n.13 (1980) (Shakespeare's
lines "express sound legal doctrine"); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 261
(1974) (admonition in Bible illustrates theory behind right of travel); Harris, Gas Royalties Leading State and Federal Cases Reviewed: Alice's Adventure in "Royalty-land," 37 OKLA. L.
REV. 699, 699 (1984) (dialogue between Humpty Dumpty and Alice explains how words have
dual meanings).
3. 703 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1986) (Schwarz II).

SOUTHWESTERN LAJW JOURNAL

(Vol. 41

ownership has been litigated, in which case if some portion of a mineral
is found within 200 feet of the surface, it belongs to the surface owner
unless, of course, the land was purchased pursuant to the Land Sales
Act of 1895, in which case even though the estates were severed before
4
June 8, 1933, the minerals belong to the mineral estate, or the State.

The Texas Supreme Court intended to instill certainty in Texas land titles
in its opinion in Moser v. United States Steel Corp. (Moser 11).5 As evidenced
by Schwarz and other post-Moser decisions, 6 however, the court has not

reached this goal. Moreover, certainty in land titles will not be established
7
until one barrier is totally removed: the surface destruction test.
Moser II permitted the surface destruction test to survive instead of summarily burying it.8 Courts in subsequent decisions, therefore, have necessarily injected new curves into the already contorted state of the law. 9 This
Article demonstrates that courts should accept the following propositions in
order to clear the path toward certainty of Texas land titles: (1) adopt a
definition of the "ordinary and natural meaning" test similar to that proposed by Dean Eugene Kuntz; and (2) bury the surface destruction test by
applying this test retrospectively.
I.

HISTORY OF THE SURFACE DESTRUCTION TEST

A. 1900-1983
Numerous articles have traced the evolvement of the surface destruction
test.10 While a detailed history is beyond the scope of this Article, a sum4. Id. at 193 (Ray, J., concurring).
5. 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984). Dean Eugene Kuntz has noted, "In matters of land
titles, and most certainly in the field of oil and gas where heavy expenditures of capital are
incident to exploration, development and production, certainty is of the utmost importance."
Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 WyO. L. J. 107, 114 (1949); see Note,
Interpretation of "Other Minerals" in a Grant or Reservation of a Mineral Interest, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 618, 620 (1986) (stability and certainty of land titles encourages development of
mineral resources and means individuals need not resort to judiciary for interpretations).
6. See, e.g., Schwartz I1, 703 S.W.2d at 189 (special rule for state); Friedman v. Texaco,
691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (surface destruction test applies retrospectively); Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. Lindholm, 714 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (Texas Uranium Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§§ 131.001-.305 (Vernon Supp. 1987) does not abrogate surface destruction test).
7. The surface destruction test requires the court to determine if the mineral can be
recovered only by quarrying or open-pit strip mining that destroys the surface for agricultural
and grazing purposes. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 519, 217 S.W.2d 994, 998 (1949).
8. 676 S.W.2d at 103 (new rules applied only prospectively).
9. See Schwarz 11, 703 S.W.2d at 189 (special rule for state); Friedman v. Texaco, 691
S.W.2d at 589 (surface destruction test applies retrospectively).
10. See Emery, What Surface Is Mineral and What Mineral Is Surface?, 12 OKLA. L.
REV. 499, 510-20 (1959); Comment, Lignite. Surface or Mineral-The Destruction Test and
More, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 879, 885-96 (1977) [hereinafter Comment, Lignite. Surface orMineral]; Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral? The Single Test Causes Double Trouble, 28
BAYLOR L. REV. 287, 300-03 (1976); Comment, What "Other Minerals" Should Mean in Wyoming, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 417, 418-26 (1986); Comment, The Need for Certainty in
Ownership of Minerals: Coal, Lignite, and Other Minerals, 22 S. TEX. L.J. 287, 293-95 (1982);
Comment, A New Approach to the Use of the Surface Estate by a Lessee Under an Oil and Gas
Lease, 13 S. TEX. L.J. 269, 269-80, 284-93 (1972); Comment, Determining Mineral Ownership
in Texas After Moser v. United States Steel Corp. -the Surface Destruction Nightmare Contin-
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mary appears necessary. As the importance of oil and gas flourished in
Texas in the early 1900s, so did litigation among the owners of mineral and
surface estates concerning the ownership of these and other valuable substances."I Courts quickly declined to apply the rule of ejusdem generis 12 to
determine if disputed substances passed in a grant of minerals. Courts instead focused on ascertaining the intent of the parties from the four corners
of the document. 13 A corollary to this approach involved determining that a
lack of actual knowledge of a substance's existence would not detract from
an intent to convey all minerals. 14 By 1936 the Texas Supreme Court had
declared, as matter of law, that the term "minerals" included oil and gas. ' 5
The fortuitous presence, however, of many other valuable substances in the
state would allow the controversies to continue. For example, Psencik v.
Wessels, 16 an appellate decision in which ownership of sand and gravel was
at issue, espoused a test that gave a broad definition to the term
"minerals."' 7
In 1949, two years after the Psencik decision, the supreme court decided
ues, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 185, 186-93 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, DeterminingMineral Ownership]; Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant or Reservation of Oil, Gas or Other Minerals?,
30 Sw. L.J. 481, 487-88 (1976); Note, Determination of Ownership of Near-Surface Mineralsas
a Matter of Law, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 715, 716-19 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Determinationof
Ownership]; Note, supra note 5, at 624-29; Note, Minerals: Moser v. United States Steel: A
New Approach to Ownership of Unspecified Minerals in Texas and Oklahoma, 37 OKLA. L.
REV. 352, 357-67 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Minerals: Moser v. United States Steel]; Note,
Mines and Minerals-Title to Minerals-Title to Substances Determined To Be Minerals as a
Matter ofLaw Is Held by Owner ofthe Mineral Estate, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 477, 477-91 (1984);
Note, Title to Uranium Is Held by the Mineral Estate Owner as a MatterofLaw, 16 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 809, 810-17 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Title to Uranium]; Note, Ownership of Unspecified Mineral Interests in Texas and Oklahoma After Reed v. Wylie II, 16 TULSA L.J. 511, 51222 (1981).
11. Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096, 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ ref'd)
(appellees argued minerals did not include oil and gas because such inclusion was not common
at the time). The Supreme Court of Texas adopted the Luse opinion in Elliot v. Nelson, 113
Tex. 62, 70-71, 251 S.W. 501, 504 (1923).
12. See Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. at 1099; Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396, 39698 (Okla. 1960). Ejusdem generis is a well-known maxim of construction, which dictates that a
court interpret a general word or phrase following a specific word or phrase as referring to
things of the same kind or character as the specific terms. Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d
264, 266-67 (10th Cir. 1963). In Luse the appellate court considered ejusdem generis difficult
to apply and "an unsafe guide." 217 S.W. at 1099; see Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v.
Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 582, 136 S.W.2d 800, 804 (1940).
13. See, e.g., Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 583, 136 S.W.2d
800, 805 (1940) (when terms not ambiguous, court ascertained intent from document alone);
Winsett v. Watson, 206 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(provision in deed did not show intent to convey sand and gravel); Praeletorian Diamond Oil
Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. Civ. App. -Beaumont
1929, writ ref'd) (question
not whether gravel is mineral, but whether gravel was intended to be conveyed).
14. See Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, no
writ) (whether parties knew of uranium did not alter intent to convey minerals); Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. at 1100 (lack of knowledge of presence of oil and gas not important).
15. Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. McEntire, 128 Tex. 124, 133, 95 S.W.2d 381, 386 (1936).
16. 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd).
17. Id. at 661. In holding that common knowledge required specific referral to sand and
gravel in a conveyance of such, the court stated that the definition of minerals should include
"what that word means in the vernacular of the mining world, the commercial world, and land
owners at the time of the grant." Id.
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Heinatz v. Allen. 18 Relying on Psencik, the Heinatz court held that a substance must be considered a mineral within the "ordinary and natural meaning" of the word. 19 The court, however, did not define the contours of that
test. The court's only guidelines included the assessment that the scientific
definition of the word "mineral" would not govern unless intended. 20 The
court also considered factors such as the nature of the substance, the substance's relation to the surface, whether the substance had special value, and
the effect of the substance's removal upon the surface. 2 1 The court noted
that the limestone in this particular tract was recoverable only by surface
destructive methods, although the court expressly stated that this fact was
not decisive. 22 The subsequent case of Cain v. Neumann,23 involving conveyed uranium, failed to cite the Heinatz opinion at all. 24 The court in Cain
specifically stated that no Texas precedents discussed uranium. 25 In the
following years the El Paso court of civil appeals rejected the special value
criterion set forth in Heinatz, 26 and applied the test from Psencik.27 This
court held that the surface destruction element, although not a decisive fac28
tor, warranted consideration.
In 1971 the Supreme Court of Texas elevated the surface destruction factor to an all-determinative test in Acker v. Guinn.29 Reed v. Wylie, 30 a coal
18. 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949) (this case questioned whether a devise of mineral
rights included commercial limestone).
19. Id. at 517, 217 S.W.2d at 997.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 516-17, 217 S.W.2d at 996-97.
22. Id. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 998.
23. 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, no writ).
24. Id. at 921-22. The court did point out that the parties had not briefed the issue in
Heinatz. Id. at 921.
25. Id.
26. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
27. See Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206, 215-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). In Heinatz the court held that "substances such as sand, gravel and limestone are
not minerals within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word unless they are rare and
exceptional in character or possess a peculiar property giving them special value .... " 147
Tex. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 997; see Eldridge v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. Civ.
App.- Eastland 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (reservation of minerals in a deed does not ordinarily
include limestone). The Atwood court viewed the special value criterion from Heinatz as obiter
dictum. Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d at 215.
28. See Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d at 211-13; Eldridge v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d
at 608.
29. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971). Acker involved the question of whether a deed that
conveyed a 1/2 interest to "oil, gas, and other minerals" passed an interest in iron ore to a
grantee. Id. at 349. The court, in deciding that the interest remained with the surface estate,
stated the following rule:
It is not ordinarily contemplated, however, that the utility of the surface for
agricultural or grazing purposes will be destroyed or substantially impaired.
Unless the contrary intention is affirmatively and fairly expressed, therefore, a
grant or reservation of "minerals" or "mineral rights" should not be construed
to include a substance that must be removed by methods that will, in effect,
consume or deplete the surface estate.
Id. at 352; see Recent Development, Texas Reexamines the Meaning of 'Minerals': Moser v.
United States Steel Corp., 19 TULSA L.J. 448, 449 (1984) (surface destruction becomes conclusive test in Acker). For two cases that applied the surface destruction test as set forth in Acker,
see DuBois v. Jacobs, 551 S.W.2d 147, 149-50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (recla-

19871

TEXAS MINERAL CLA USES

and lignite case that reached the supreme court twice, subsequently modified
this all-determinative test. In the opinion's final form the surface destruction
test required numerous factual determinations before a decision could be
made regarding who owned what substance. 3' These determinations ranged
from the various locations of the substance on the particular tract to the
32
available methods of substance removal.
B.

Moser II and Its Deficiencies

The surface destruction test resulted in land titles being decided more by

inspecting the land than by reading the instruments of conveyance. 33 In
Moser v. United States Steel Corp.34 the supreme court recognized that deter35
mining ownership of minerals by land inspection led to title uncertainty.
36
The court, therefore, purported to abandon the surface destruction test.
The court additionally set forth rules governing surface damage, suggested
by Dean Eugene Kuntz, 37 in an attempt to strike an equitable balance between the rights of the mineral and surface estate owners. 38 These rules
require the mineral estate owner to compensate the surface owner only for
mation efforts deemed immaterial by the court) and Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127, 130-31
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ) (court deemed reclamation efforts immaterial).
30. 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977) (Reed I), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980) (Reed
H). In the Reed cases the dispute concerned ownership of coal and lignite. Reed I added to
the Acker test by requiring proof, "as of the date of the instrument being construed," that
extraction of the near-surface substance would necessarily have consumed or depleted the surface. Reed 1, 554 S.W.2d at 172. The court in Reed I also held that only those substances that
must be removed by surface destructive methods belong to the surface estate. Id. The
supreme court remanded the case to the trial court because the record did not contain information regarding the location of the lignite. Id. at 173. When the case reached the supreme court
again, the court made the following changes: (1) a substance that is "near-surface" will not be
granted or retained as a mineral if the surface owner shows that any reasonable method of
removal will destroy or deplete the surface; (2) the court considered the trial date, rather than
the date of the instrument, important; and (3) the court defined surface and near-surface as a
matter of law. Reed 11, 597 S.W.2d at 747-48 (emphasis added).
31. Reed 11, 597 S.W.2d at 750 (Spears, J., concurring). Judge Spears noted that a court
must resolve at least four possible fact issues in order to determine whether the surface owner
or the mineral estate owner owns coal and lignite: (1) whether deposits are located in the
immediate vicinity of the surface; (2) whether deposits lie "at or near" the surface; (3) whether
deposits must conform to the earth's surface; and (4) whether a method of recovery is reasonable. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Reed 1, 554 S.W.2d at 182 (Daniels, J., dissenting), modified, Reed 11, 597 S.W.2d
at 743.
34. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427 (June 8, 1983) (Moser I), opinion withdrawn, 676 S.W.2d 99
(Tex. 1984) (Moser 11).
35. Moser 11, 676 S.W.2d at 101; Moser I, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 428.
36. Moser 11, 676 S.W.2d at 102. The court held that "a severance of minerals in an oil,
gas and other minerals clause includes all substances within the ordinary and natural meaning
of that word, whether their presence or value is known at the time of the severance." Id. The
withdrawn opinion, Moser I, referred to knowledge at the time of "extraction." 26 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. at 429.
37. Dean Eugene 0. Kuntz was admitted to practice in Texas in 1938. Dean Kuntz received an LL.M from Harvard University and taught at the University of Wyoming.
38. Moser 11, 676 S.W.2d at 102.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

negligently inflicted damage when a substance is specifically conveyed. 39
When a mineral estate owner takes a substance through a general grant of
"other minerals," however, the surface owner is liable for any surface
damage. 4°
The supreme court handed down its original opinion on June 8, 1983.
One
year later the court withdrew the opinion and replaced it with Moser
II. 4 1 As in Moser I, the court's opinion in Moser H failed to clarify the
"ordinary and natural meaning" test. 42 Moser II also did not specify factors
to be considered in determining damages. 43 Nevertheless, the two opinions
differed significantly. First, the court ruled that the standards set forth in
Moser H would only apply prospectively from the date of the first opinion,
thus eliminating a "window period" set forth in Moser L 44 Second, the
court added the opinion of Reed v. Wylie 4 5 to its list of cases that it would
continue to recognize as establishing certain substances as belonging to the
surface estate as a matter of law. 46 Although this second difference appears
subtle, its effect is significant. In Reed II the court applied the surface destruction test to determine the ownership of near-surface lignite, iron, and
coal. 47 It appears incongruous for the court to overrule the surface destruction test and, in the same opinion, add a case that applied the surface destruction test to its list of substances that belong to the surface. As many
writers have noted,4 8 however, in Moser II the court indicated that the sur39. Id. The court reasoned that when a substance is specifically named, the parties probably contemplated some surface damage in negotiating a price. Id. at 103.
40. Id.
41. See supra note 34.
42. In establishing the "ordinary and natural meaning" test as law, the opinions simply
cite Psencik, Heinatz, and Cain without further elaboration. Moser 11, 676 S.W.2d at 102;
Moser I, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 428-29.
43. Neither opinion provided a formula, such as the difference in market value before and
after extraction. Both opinions, however, contain a footnote stating that the damages rules
will not affect the statutory duties of mineral owners under the reclamation acts. Moser 11, 676
S.W.2d at 103 n.4; Moser 1, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 429 n.4.
44. Moser II, 676 S.W.2d at 103. In Moser I the court held that the surface destruction
test would still apply to leases and deeds executed between the date of the Acker opinion,
February 10, 1971, and the date of its opinion, June 8, 1983. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 430. Many
writers criticized this window period. See, e.g., Laity, Oil Gas & Minerals, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 195, 197, 198 (1984) (litigation not reduced due to window period);
Note, Minerals: Moser v. United States Steel, supra note 10, at 367 (fact scenarios of problems
caused by window period); Recent Developments, supra note 29, at 455 (window period equitable, but causes problems for title examiners and courts). The court chose to rule prospectively in both opinions under an assumption that parties could have relied on its holdings in
Acker and Reed I. Moser H, 676 S.W.2d at 103; Moser 1, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 430.
45. 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977) (Reed I), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980) (Reed

H).
46. Compare Moser 11, 676 S.W.2d at 101 (list includes Reed 11, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.
1980); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512,
217 S.W.2d 994 (1949); Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App-El Paso 1962,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Union Sulphur Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 42 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1931, writ ref'd); Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd)) with Moser 1, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 428 (Reed II
not included in list).
47. 597 S.W.2d at 748 (coal and lignite awarded to surface owner under surface destruction test).
48. See A. H. WILLIAMS & C, MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 219 (1986); Comment,

1987]

TEXAS MINERAL CLA USES

face destruction test was to continue to be viable for near-surface lignite,
iron, and coal, even after June 8, 1983. 49 The court's opinion in Moser 11,
therefore, due to its prospective ruling and the addition of Reed 11, pumped
new life into the surface destruction test, rather than removing its crippling
effects on Texas land titles.
II.

THE POST-MOSER CASES

Moser 11 proved deficient in three respects. First, it allowed the surface
destruction test to survive. Second, it did not provide a clear definition of
the "ordinary and natural meaning" test. Third, it did not clarify the damages issue. The first Moser 11 deficiency, allowing the surface destruction
test to survive, appeared in Friedman v. Texaco,5 0 Schwarz v. State,5 1 and
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Lindholm.5 2 The courts handed down all of these
decisions after the Moser 11 opinion.
A. Friedman v. Texaco-The Retroactive Rule
In Friedman the supreme court clarified the prospective ruling in Moser 11
by holding that the new rules would apply to "severances" of "other minerals" that occurred after June 8, 1983. 53 This holding ended speculation as to
which event would trigger application of the Moser rules. 54 The Friedman
court, however, also held that the surface destruction test applied to all severances prior to June 8, 1983, even those that pre-dated the Acker and Reed
55
opinions.
As in Moser, the Friedman decision involved a dispute over uranium ownership between the owners of the mineral and surface estates. In 1939 Adele
Friedman leased the oil, gas, and other minerals to Magnolia Petroleum. In
1959 Mrs. Friedman sold the land to Martin subject to a reservation of all
the oil, gas, and other minerals. Martin subsequently executed a lease to
Texaco.
Determining Mineral Ownership, supra note 10, at 201; Note, Determination of Ownership,
supra note 10, at 725; Note, supra note 5, at 639 n. 107; Note, Title to Uranium,supra note 10,
at 822.
49. See Schwarz v. State, 703 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Tex. 1986) (Schwarz II) (Moser II held
that near-surface iron ore, coal, and lignite belong to surface as matter of law); Hobbs v. Hutson, 733 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, writ granted) (held lignite near-surface as matter of law); Holland v. Kiper, 696 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (cited Moser H for proposition that surface destruction test determines ownership
of coal and lignite).
50. 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985).
51. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985) (Schwarz I), opinion withdrawn, 703
S.W.2d 187, 193 (Tex. 1986) (Schwarz II).
52. 714 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. 692 S.W.2d at 589.
54. The Moser H opinion did not clarify whether the date of trial, severance, or extraction
would govern. 676 S.W.2d at 103; see Comment, DeterminingMineral Ownership, supra note
10, at 196 (three possible events were severance, mineral transaction, and trial date).
55. 691 S.W.2d at 589. The court held that the test "will apply even in cases where there
has been no reliance on Acker and Reed because the minerals conveyed in a pre-Acker severance should not depend on the fortuitous event of reliance on subsequent law by a subsequent
lessee or purchaser." Id.
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Justice Spears, writing for the majority, recognized that at the time of the
conveyance in 1954, the court had not yet written the Acker and Reed opinions. 5 6 Justice Spears stated, however, that while the law remained unsettled
at that time, the surface destruction concept was not new." 7 This historical
background led the court to apply the surface destruction test to a 1939 lease
58
and a 1959 deed.
This holding contorts the already confused state of the law in this area.
The case permits the surface destruction test to apply to instruments executed not only before the test was formulated, but also to those instruments
executed even before surface destruction was considered a significant factor.5 9 This extension of the surface destruction test contradicts the very
premise supporting the court's prospective ruling in Moser II: the protection
of parties who could have relied upon the Acker and Reed opinions. 60 The
Friedman opinion, however, stands as an unwarranted retroactive extension
of the surface destruction test, which further detracts from the remedial
goals of Moser II.
B.

Schwartz v. State--The State Exception

The supreme court's second post-Moser decision arose in Schwarz v.
State.6 1 The court once again withdrew its original opinion, Schwarz I, and
replaced it with a second, Schwarz II. The two opinions produced opposite
results. The final holding, however, introduced the following exception to
the already exceptional rules in this area: when the state includes a general
reservation of minerals in a conveyance, the intent is that all coal and lignite
62
are to be withheld, regardless of any destruction occurring in recovery.
The facts of the Schwarz case differ from others in that the State of Texas,
rather than an individual, owned the mineral estate. The reservation of the
minerals occurred in a conveyance of the land made pursuant to the Land
Sales Act of 1895 and the 1907 amendments thereto. 63 The reservation itself
56. Id. at 588.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 589. The court applied the surface destruction test and held that uranium did
not pass to Magnolia under the 1939 lease, but that Friedman retained and conveyed the

uranium to Martin in the 1959 deed. Id.
59. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text. Prior to Heinatz, 147 Tex. 512, 217

S.W.2d 994 (1949), the courts focused on the intent of the parties and did not discuss surface
destruction. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
60. Moser 11, 676 S.W.2d at 103. The court ruled prospectively due to "the extent of

public reliance" on Acker and Reed and "because of an inability to foresee a coming change in
the law." Id.
61. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488 (June 12, 1985) (Schwarz I), opinion withdrawn, 703 S.W.2d
187 (Tex. 1986) (Schwarz II).
62. Schwarz 11, 703 S.W.2d at 189. The state made the conveyance pursuant to the Land
Sales Act of 1895 and the 1907 amendments thereto, Land Sales Act of 1895, 1895 Tex. Gen.
Laws 47, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 793 (1898) (as amended) (codified at TEX. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. § 51.011 (Vernon 1978)). Schwarz 11, 703 S.W.2d at 188. The court's holding, therefore, may be restricted to patents issued under these acts.
63. Schwarz II, 703 S.W.2d at 188. The legislature passed the Land Sales Acts to enable
the state to convey lands that had been declared public domain. See Schendell v. Rogan, 94

1987]

TEXAS MINERAL CLA USES

did not specifically mention coal and lignite.64 In Schwarz the court followed the dictates of Moser 11 and Friedman and applied the surface destruction test, since the severance occurred prior to June 8, 1983,65 and the
instrument did not express a contrary intent. 66 The court in Schwarz I held
that the surface owners had established their burden of proof and awarded
them the rights to the coal and lignite; it expressly rejected the state's position that the legislature intended to reserve
all minerals "with the corre67
sponding right to destroy the surface."
In Schwarz 11 this rejected contention became the court's holding. 68 The
court in arriving at this conclusion emphasized that the "presumed intent"
rule developed in the Acker and Reed decisions is merely a construction device, which must not be applied when specific intent is expressed or when
another rule of construction controls. 69 The court believed that since the
70
state was the grantor, the rules of construction favored the state.
The court also stated that history revealed empirical evidence that the
legislature intended a broad reservation of minerals. 71 The Schwarz 11 court,
however, relied on the same history in Schwarz I in support of the opposite
conclusion. 72 From this fact alone, even without a close examination of the
Tex. 585, 586, 63 S.W. 1001, 1002 (1901). The 1907 Act amended the 1905 Act by adding the
following section:
The land which is now or may hereafter be classified as mineral may be sold for
agricultural or grazing purposes, but all sales of such land shall be upon the
express condition that the minerals shall be and are reserved to the fund to
which the land belongs and such reservations shall be stated in all applications
to purchase ....
Schwarz 1, 703 S.W.2d at 188 (citing Act of May 16, 1907, ch. 20, § 2, 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws
490, 495 (codified at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 51.011 (Vernon 1978)). For a review of
Sales Acts and other statutes applicable to land purchases from the state, see 3 F. LANGE,
LAND TITLES AND TITLE EXAMINATION §§ 231-239 (Texas Practice 1961 & Supp. 1978).
64. Schwarz H1, 703 S.W.2d at 188. The patent issued to Schwarz's predecessor in title
stated that "[A]II of the minerals in the above described land are reserved to the state." Id.
65. Compare Moser 11, 676 S.W.2d at 103 (holding applies prospectively from June 8,
1983) with Friedman v. Texaco, 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (Moser HI applies to severances after June 8, 1983).
66. See Reed HI, 597 S.W.2d at 745 (surface destruction test applies only when no contrary intent expressed); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
67. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 491. Expert testimony established that coal was located at a
depth averaging 50 feet, which qualifies as surface as a matter of law under Reed I. Id.
68. 703 S.W.2d at 189. The court held that:
[T]he proper interpretation of the conveyance between the Alexanders and the
State of Texas is that the State of Texas meant to withhold from conveyance all
of the coal or lignite located on or under the surface of the land granted,
whether or not recovery of such would destroy or deplete the surface estate.
Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. State, 121 Tex. 138, 158-59, 47 S.W.2d 265, 272
(1932). The court noted that "legislative grants of property, rights, or privileges must be construed strictly in favor of the State on grounds of public policy, and whatever is not unequivocally granted in clear and explicit terms is withheld." Id.
71. Id. at 189-90. The empirical evidence surveyed Mexican law, the Land Sales Act of
1895, the Texas Constitution, and case law. See infra note 72.
72. Schwarz I1,703 S.W.2d at 189-90 (citing Cowan v. Hardeman, 26 Tex. 217 (1862); S.
Scor, LAS SIETE PARTIDAS partida II, title XV (1931); Mining Act of 1883, 1883 Tex. Gen.

Laws 97, § 3, 9 H.

GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS

406 (1898) (repealed 1967)).
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specific cases and legislation relied upon in the two opinions, 73 one conclusion may be drawn: the intent of the legislature in providing for a general
74
mineral reservation is unclear.

The surface destruction test evolved because parties who were unclear in
their documents utilized the broad clause of "oil, gas, and other minerals."
In most cases parties did not express their intent on a particular substance
because, due to lack of knowledge or concern, they had no intent. 7 5 The
76
surface destruction test, in essence, looked to supply this missing intent.
Since that test proved unsuccessful, the court abandoned it in favor of the
73. In Schwarz II the court relied upon Cowan v. Hardeman, 26 Tex. 217 (1862), for the
proposition that the state intended a broad definition of minerals and stated that "[i]t is difficult to rationalize how a dry salt lake on the surface of a grant is part of the reserved mineral

estate and a deposit of lignite 50 feet below the surface is not." Schwarz II, 703 S.W.2d at 190.
The reliance on Cowan, however, is misplaced for two reasons. First, the court decided Cowan
prior to the constitution of 1866 when the state adopted and declared a policy different from
that of Mexican law. Under Mexican law, which had been adopted by statute in Texas, no
minerals passed by an ordinary grant without express words of designation. See Cox v. Robinson, 105 Tex. 426, 439, 150 S.W. 1149, 1156 (1912); G. SMEDLEY, OIL AND GAS LAWS OF
TEXAS 8-12 (1921). In the constitutions of 1866, 1869, and 1876, however, the state released
all "mines and mineral substances" to the owner of the soil. See TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 39
(1866); TEX. CONST. art. X, § 9 (1869); TEX. CONST. art. XIV, § 7 (1876); Comment, Relinquishment ofState Owned Minerals-TheAgency RelationshipBetween the "Owner of the Soil"
and the State, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 62, 62-63 (1975) (traces history and purposes of the constitutional mandates. This evolvement expressed a policy in favor of private, as opposed to state,
ownership of minerals, thus reversing the policy under Mexican law, which governed when the
court decided Cowan. See G. SMEDLEY, supra, at 7-12. The second reason the court's reliance
on Cowan is misplaced is that the Cowan court was construing a proviso in a statute to determine the validity of a patent to a particular tract of land with a salt spring on it. 26 Tex. at
219-20. The proviso read as follows: "Provided, that no lands granted by this government
shall be located on salt springs, gold or silver mines, copper or lead, or other minerals, or any
island of the republic." Id. at 220. In the statute containing the proviso in question the legislature clearly espoused its intent to keep specific substances for the benefit of the public. On the
contrary, the Land Sales Act of 1895, as amended in 1907, simply contained a general reservation of "minerals" in lands they granted expressly for "agricultural or grazing purposes." Act
of May 16, 1907, ch. 20, § 2, 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws 490, 490-95 (codified at TEX. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. § 51.011 (Vernon 1978)). It is incongruous to hold that the state also reserved the
right to destroy the surface for agricultural or grazing purposes. Accord Schwarz 1, 28 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. at 490 (Justice McGee analyzed the Land Sales Act and concluded that its clear
intent was "to encourage the settlement" of the state and "to convey the surface estate for
farming or agricultural purposes"). Dean Kuntz suggests using a very broad definition of
minerals when presented with a general reservation of minerals. See Kuntz, supra note 5, at
112. The Supreme Court of Texas cites this approach with approval in Moser II, 676 S.W.2d
at 102.
74. The difficulty in ascertaining the legislature's intent when it passes a law respecting
public lands was appropriately set forth by the Supreme Court of Texas in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 125 Tex. 430, 436, 83 S.W.2d 929, 932, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 623 (1935):
Many laws have been enacted respecting public lands and the minerals
therein.... To one who will study the extent and intricacies of our school land
laws, and the purposes for which they were enacted, it is quite obvious that they
were not always clear in their meaning ....
[O]ur school land laws have been to
a large extent patchwork, each law being cumulative of the other, and no new
law repealing a prior law, unless clearly repugnant to the prior law.
75. See Kuntz, supra note 5, at 112. Dean Kuntz stated that "[t]he contradiction and
conflict between the cases on the point arise from the very fact that the courts are seeking to
give effect to an intention to include or exclude a specific substance, when, as a matter of fact,
the parties had nothing specific in mind on the matter at all." Id. (emphasis in original);
accord Moser II, 676 S.W.2d at 102 (cites Kuntz with approval).
76. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (unless contrary intent ex-
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"ordinary and natural meaning" test. 77 As Justice C.L. Ray pointed out in
his concurrence in Schwarz I1, had the court ruled retrospectively in Moser
11 to enable it to apply an "ordinary and natural meaning" test to the con78
veyance in Schwarz, it could have achieved the same equitable result.
Schwarz 11 instead stands as another exception, with questionable basis, to
the Moser 11 rules.
C. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Lindholm-Manifestations
of the Moser II Deficiencies
The Corpus Christi court of appeals' opinion in Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
Lindholm 7 9 is the most recent decision to apply the Moser 11 rules. The

same issue as in Moser appeared: whether uranium belonged to the surface
estate owner or the mineral estate owner. 80 Unlike other post-Moser decisions, Atlantic Richfield did not create a new contortion in this area of the
law because the court precisely followed the dictates of Moser II and Friedman.8 ' Atlantic Richfield instead demonstrates two inequities that will persist since the supreme court allowed the surface destruction test to survive.
The court's holding in Friedman made the first inequity possible. 82 As in
Friedman,the Atlantic Richfield court applied the surface destruction test to
deeds executed decades before formulation of the test.8 3 The second inequity stemmed from the retrospective rulings in Moser 11 and Friedman.
These retrospective rulings allowed the Atlantic Richfield court to ignore the
mineral owner's argument that the Texas Uranium Surface
Mining and Rec85
lamation Act8 4 overcomes the surface destruction rule.
The reclamation statutes became law after the supreme court formulated
the surface destruction test in Acker.8 6 In Reed I, however, a decision
handed down after the reclamation statutes became law, the Texas Supreme
pressed, court will construe intent to exclude from term "minerals" substances that surface

destruction methods must remove).
77. Schwarz II, 703 S.W.2d at 192-93.
78. Id. at 192-93 (Ray, J., concurring).

79. 714 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. Id. at 391.
81. Id. at 392. The court cited Moser II and Friedman for the rule that Reed II governs

severances of uranium prior to June 8, 1983. Id. The court awarded the uranium to the surface owner, since expert testimony revealed that any reasonable method of extraction would

destroy the surface. Id. Another recent decision on this issue viewed Moser II as establishing
that near-surface lignite belongs to the surface owner as a matter of law; the surface destruction test was therefore not applied. See Hobbs v. Hutson, 733 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. App.-

Texarkana 1987, writ granted).
82. See supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.

83. 714 S.W.2d at 391. The court applied the surface destruction test to 1934 and 1949
deeds. Id.

84. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 131.002(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
85. 714 S.W.2d at 393. The mineral owners argued that the land could not be considered
destroyed since it must be restored. Id.
86. See Note, Texas Surface Mining and Reclamation Act-New Hope for Protection of
Texas Resources, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 850, 850 (1976). Reclamation statutes require that land be
restored to "the same or a substantially beneficial condition." TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 131.102(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987). Compare Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex.
1971) (adopted surface destruction test in 1971) with Texas Uranium Surface Mining and Rec-
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Court held that surface restoration or reclamation possibilities became
irrelevant under the surface destruction test.8 7 This holding denied the very
premise upon which the formulators based the surface destruction test: if
the surface will be destroyed, the substance belongs to the surface estate
owner; if the surface will not be destroyed due to reclamation efforts, the
substance should belong to the mineral estate owner. 81 The appellate court
in Atlantic Richfield, however, relied on Reed I and declared reclamation
efforts irrelevant.8 9 Reed I still possesses precedential value to pre-June 8,
1983, decisions due to the retroactive rulings. The supreme court's view on
reclamation statutes in Reed, however, contradicts its latest expression on
the significance of these statutes in Schwarz II. In Schwarz II the court
stressed the importance of these reclamation statutes in holding that the
state intended to reserve all minerals whether or not the surface is
destroyed. 90
In Schwarz II and Moser H the supreme court recognized that when the
reclamation statutes and the payment of damages protect the surface owner,
ownership of the substances should not change. 9' In Atlantic Richfield,
however, inequities resulted due to the prospective ruling in Moser II and
the retrospective extension of the surface destruction test in Friedman. The
court gave the surface owner the uranium despite the fact that the deeds
predated the emergence of the surface destruction test and that reclamation
statutes required the mineral owner to restore the land, thereby possibly ne92
gating all surface destruction.
III.

THE ROYALTY RULES-A PRE-MOSER CONTORTION

Atlantic Richfield demonstrates that the inequities of the surface destruction test will flourish due to the retrospective extension of the test in Friedman and the prospective ruling in Moser II. In Schwarz the court created
one exception to the Moser II rulings. 93 Martin v. Schneider,94 a pre-Moser
case, created another exception to the application of the surface destruction
lamation Act, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 131.001-.305 (Vernon Supp. 1987) (first passed
in 1975 as Texas Surface Mining and Reclamation Act).
87. 554 S.W.2d at 172 ("If the method of production required the removal of surface soil,
it is immaterial that devices of restoration or reclamation were available."); accord Williford v.
Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ) (fact that mining company
took steps to restore land immaterial).
88. See supra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
89. 714 S.W.2d at 393.
90. 703 S.W.2d at 191. The court cited TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 53.065-.066
(Vernon 1978), which provide that money paid to the mineral estate owner for certain minerals
reserved to the state will be divided with the surface owner to compensate for damages to the
soil. Id. The court also noted that chapter 131 of the Natural Resources Code requires reclamation. Id.
91. Schwarz II, 703 S.W.2d at 191 (existence of reclamation statutes one reason court held
state reserved all minerals); Moser II, 676 S.W.2d at 102-03 (damages required to balance

rights of surface and mineral estate owners, but duties under reclamation statutes still apply).
92. Atlantic Richfield, 714 S.W.2d at 393.
93. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
94. 622 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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test. 9 5
In Martin the Corpus Christi court of appeals faced a controversy between
the owner of the surface and mineral estates in a tract and his grantor, who
had reserved a nonparticipating royalty interest in oil, gas, and other minerals. The owner executed a mining lease, and subsequently uranium was discovered. The owner claimed all rights in the uranium, since under the
surface destruction test the uranium would be considered part of the surface
estate. The court ruled that the surface destruction test did not apply to a
royalty interest standing alone. 96 The court justified this exception by stating that a nonparticipating royalty owner possesses no right to produce the
minerals, but must await production by the owner of the tract. 97 Since the
land will only be destroyed when the owner institutes production, the court
determined that the owner does not need protection. 98 The court, therefore,
ruled that the "other minerals" clause in his conveyance entitled the grantor
of the nonparticipating royalty interest to royalties. 99
A subsequent civil appeals case, which presented basically the same question, came to a different result. In Storm Associates, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.100
the owners of both the surface and mineral estates conveyed royalty interests
to three different parties. Storm Associates, Inc. succeeded in interest to one
of the three royalty deeds. Years later, the owners sold the surface estate to
Martin with a reservation of all the oil, gas, and other minerals. Martin
subsequently leased the estate to Texaco. One of the original grantors,
joined by the royalty owners, sought a declaratory judgment that the deed to
Martin conveyed no interest in the uranium. The court concluded that
under the surface destruction test the surface owner owned the uranium. 101
The court ruled that the royalty owners possessed no rights in the uranium
despite the fact that they received their interests when their grantors owned
both the mineral and surface estates. 10 2 The Storm court attempted to distinguish the Martin opinion but the two remain irreconcilable. 103 In both
95. Id. at 622.

96. Id. at 622. The court stated that the surface destruction test is "limited to mineral
ownership and not applicable to a mere royalty interest." Id. But see Hobbs v. Hutson, 733
S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, writ granted) (applied the presumed general
intent rule of the surface destruction test even though a nonparticipating royalty owner was
involved).

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. An earlier appellate court decision had applied the surface destruction test to a
reservation of a royalty interest. See Dubois v. Jacobs, 551 S.W.2d 147, 148-49 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, no writ). The Martin court distinguished Jacobs because the Austin court
of appeals decided the case before either of the Reed decisions. Martin, 622 S.W.2d at 622.
For a detailed examination of the implications of Martin, see Note, Determination of Ownership, supra note 10, at 719-24 (views Martin as establishing three different classes of royalty
owners).
100. 645 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982), aff'd, 691 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1985).
101. 645 S.W.2d at 584-85.
102. Id. at 587.
103. See id. The court distinguished Martin by saying:
[T]he court in Martin found that the appellant owned the mineralestate; and we
must assume that the royalty reserved was an interest in the mineral estate.
That is not the case here, where the trial court has found, and we have agreed,
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cases the grantor owned both the mineral and surface estates when the royalty owners took their interests. 10 4 In Storm, however, a subsequent severance of the mineral and surface estates occurred, and the court, in
distinguishing Martin, ruled that the surface destruction test applied to that
conveyance as well as to the royalty deeds. 10 5 This severance, however,
should not affect the interests previously conveyed. Unfortunately, the
supreme court did not have the opportunity to clarify the conflict in the two
cases since the royalty owners in Storm did not appeal.
Under Moser II and Friedman two rulings on the rights of royalty owners
will persist. For pre-June 8, 1983, severances, the royalty interests conveyed
in an oil, gas, and other minerals clause could depend upon whether or not
the estate had previously been severed, the substance's location, and methods of extraction. According to Storm, a subsequent severance may be determinative. Under an ordinary and natural meaning test, however, a
royalty owner would simply need to check his title to insure that his grantor
owned the mineral estate at severance. Even if there had been a prior severance, there would be no possibility that substances satisfying the ordinary
and natural meaning test belonged to the surface estate. This impossibility
would render other factual determinations regarding location of the substance unnecessary. Similarly, a subsequent severance would not affect previously conveyed royalty interests. Unfortunately, title inquiry for royalty
owners who acquired their interests before June 8, 1983, is not this simple
due to the survival of the surface destruction test.
IV.

THE "ORDINARY AND NATURAL MEANING" TEST

A.

The Problem

As the three post-Moser decisions illustrate, one deficiency of Moser II is
that it allowed the admittedly villainous surface destruction test to continue.' 0 6 Another deficiency in Moser II involved the failure of the court to
delineate the contours of the ordinary and natural meaning test that it
adopted. As the majority and dissenting opinions in Friedman demonstrate,
10 7
the state of the law in Texas prior to Acker v. Guinn stands disputed.
Many writers have stated that the ordinary and natural meaning test, as
formulated in Heinatz,l0 s represented the law. 10 9 While the Heinatz court
that Martin owns the uranium by virtue of ownership of the surface estate, not
of the mineral estate.
Id. (emphasis in original).
104. Compare id. at 581 with Martin v. Schneider, 622 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
105. Storm, 645 S.W.2d at 587.
106. See supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
107. Compare Friedman v. Texaco, 691 S.W.2d 587, 588-89 (Spears, J.,for majority)
(Acker did not change law as surface destruction was not new concept) with Friedman v.
Texaco, 691 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1985) (Ray, J.,dissenting) (in 1959 "ordinary and natural
meaning test used to determine what constituted 'minerals' ").
108. See supra notes 18-21.
concurring) ("For decades the term
109. See, e.g., Schwarz H, 703 S.W.2d at 192 (Ray, J.,
mineral was governed by the ordinary and natural meaning of the word."); Comment, Deter-
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did state that courts were to accord the term "other minerals" its ordinary
and natural meaning,I10 the court did not clarify this statement. The court
simply added that courts should consider certain factors, including surface
destruction. " ' None of the cases after Heinatz clearly followed an ordinary
and natural meaning test. 1 2 Texas law prior to Acker involved a substance5
by-substance approach' '3 and the test from Psencik. 14 As noted earlier, '

the Psencik test focused on the vernacular of the word minerals as determined by land owners and those in the commercial world. 1' 16
After Moser 11 it is apparent that the courts will continue to use a substance-by-substance approach." 7 What is not clear, however, is whether the
court intended to adopt the Psencik approach as the ordinary and natural
meaning test. While precedent might permit this,' 1 8 it does not require such
an adoption since the court never clearly defined or followed the ordinary
and natural meaning test. Furthermore, the Psencik test would do little to
achieve land title stability. In applying the surface destruction test such an
approach would require numerous factual findings. Testimony on custom
and usage would simply replace testimony regarding the location of the substance and reasonable extraction methods. Dean Kuntz admonished against
the use of testimony on custom and usage. 1 9 In order to obtain the Texas
mining Mineral Ownership,supra note 10, at 187 n.8 (prior to Acker, Texas courts followed an
ordinary and natural meaning test); Note, supra note 5, at 625 n.29 (prior to Acker, Texas used
ordinary and natural meaning test, but considered surface destruction a factor). But see
Dobray, Oil Shale, Tar Sands and the Definition of a Mineral: An Old Problem in a New
Context, 22 TULSA L.J. 1, 16 (1986) (cites Heinatz as case applying surface destruction test).
110. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517-19, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997-98 (1949).

111. Id.
112. See Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (rejected special value criterion of Heinatz); Fleming v. Texaco, 337 S.W.2d 846,
852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (used test from Psencik and focused on
usage of word "minerals"); Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915, 921-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1958, no writ) (neither Heinatz nor ordinary and natural meaning test cited).
113. See Moser H, 676 S.W.2d at 101 (lists cases that determined certain substances belong
to surface as matter of law); Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. McEntire, 128 Tex. 124, 133, 95 S.W.2d 381,
386 (1936) (oil and gas included in "other minerals" clause as matter of law).
114. See Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Fleming v. Texaco, 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
115. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
116. Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd).
The court relied on an English case in formulating this test. Id.
117. See Moser 11, 676 S.W.2d at 101 (lists substances that shall belong to surface as matter
of law).
118. See Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 518, 522, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997, 1000 (1949). In
Heinatz the court cited Psencik as authority for stating that "sand, gravel and limestone are
not minerals within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word.
... Id. at 518, 217
S.W.2d at 997. The court also pointed out that it had refused writ in Heinatz and thereby
evidenced "its conviction that the principles of law declared [therein] were correctly determined." Id. at 522, 217 S.W.2d at 1000. Subsequent cases used the Psencik test. See Atwood
v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fleming v.
Texaco, 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
119. Kuntz, supra note 5, at 114. Dean Kuntz stated, "A rule which requires consideration of the contemporaneous factual or legal setting would create the impossible situation of
requiring the title examiner . . . to retain a catalogued knowledge of the law as to dates of
development. In either event, he could never be confident of his conclusion." Id.
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Supreme Court's goal of title certainty, the test followed in Texas must avoid
factual determinations apart from the instrument itself. If the ordinary and
natural meaning test is to be effective in the future, the court must define its
contours.
B.

A Solution

In Moser II the Texas Supreme Court adopted Dean Kuntz's philosophy
of separating the questions of what is a mineral and whether an owner may
extract that mineral. 120 The Moser H court should have gone further and
adopted Dean Kuntz's definition or test for the language "other minerals" 12in
Texas clauses. The definition or test involves defining minerals broadly. '
Texas, however, already has determined that certain substances, though valuable and separate from the soil, belong to the surface.' 22 One author suggested that these decisions could make adoption of the Kuntz approach
difficult, but offered the following solution: do not overrule decisions that
have determined certain substances are surface or mineral as a matter of law,
but view them as exceptions to the broad category of minerals espoused by
Dean Kuntz. 123 The ordinary and natural meaning test in Texas would consist of a general rule that a mineral estate owner possesses all valuable substances. Sand, gravel, limestone, caliche, surface shale, and water would be
exceptions to this rule. 124 To determine whether minerals can be extracted,
courts should turn to the accommodation of estates doctrine as modified in
Moser 11.125 This test would be consistent with the admonition in Heinatz
126
that courts should not use the term "minerals" in the technical sense.
The test is also consistent with the substance-by-substance approach, which,
as demonstrated in Moser II, Texas courts will continue to use.' 27 The test,
120. 676 S.W.2d at 102.
121. Kuntz, supra note 5, at 113. Dean Kuntz defines minerals as "all substances presently
valuable in themselves, apart from the soil, whether their presence is known or not ... and that
nothing presently or prospectively valuable as extracted substances would be intended to be
excluded from the mineral estate." Id.
122. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1972) (fresh water); Heinatz
v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 518, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949) (limestone); Atwood v. Rodman, 355
S.W.2d 206, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (caliche and surface shale);
Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1929, writ ref'd) (sand and gravel).
123. See Broyles, The Right to Mine Texas Uranium and Coal By Surface Methods: Acker
v. Guinn Revisited, 13 Hous. L. REV. 451, 475-76 (1976).
124. The Moser II court listed these substances as those that the Texas courts previously
had determined belonged to the surface estate as a matter of law. 676 S.W.2d at 101. The
Moser II court also cited Reed II for the proposition that near-surface lignite, iron, and coal
belong to the surface. Id. at 101. As previously noted, inclusion is improper since Reed II
employed the surface destruction test. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. Under
the Kuntz test, lignite, iron, and coal would belong to the mineral estate owner.
125. See infra notes 156-175 and accompanying text.
126. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949). The court disapproved of the scientific definition because that broad definition included "even the soil itself."
Id. For a further discussion of Heinatz, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. The
Kuntz rule modified by the exceptions would narrow the definition so as to be consistent with
this statement.
127. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
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however, would avoid the factual determinations inevitable in a test focusing
on custom and usage as stipulated in Psencik. Furthermore, in Acker, the
case that first clearly established the surface destruction test, the court relied
upon Dean Kuntz's theory. 12 8 Adopting the above test would finally follow
this reliance to its logical conclusion. 129
The ordinary and natural meaning test as formulated above provides the
only solution that will satisfy both Texas precedent and the omnipresent goal
of achieving title certainty. A title examiner would know that a lease or
deed with an "other minerals" clause conveyed all valuable substances except limestone, gravel, water, caliche, surface shale, and sand. Uranium,
coal, iron, and lignite would all pass to the grantee. Similarly, any newly
discovered substance of value would pass to the grantee. 130 The test would
also withstand technological advances in that ownership of a substance
would not change even if new methods of recovery are developed that alleviate surface destructive effects. Since the rule is clear and stable, parties
would immediately be aware of the need to express a different intent if they
did not wish the rule to apply to a particular severance. In other words, title
examiners and other interested parties would no longer need to await innumerable factual determinations about location of a substance and surface
destruction before knowing who owned what substance. Unfortunately, due
to the prospective rulings in Moser 11 and Friedman, Texas land titles have
not reached this pinnacle.
128. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (rex. 1971). The court quoted at length from
Dean Kuntz's article. Id.

129. Several writers have pointed out that the court relied upon Dean Kuntz's theory in
Acker, but in fact adopted an opposite rule. See, e.g., Broyles, supra note 123, at 475 (court did

what Kuntz warned about and conferred valuable mineral upon surface owner); Comment,
Lignite: Surface Or Mineral?,supra note 10, at 288 (Acker uses Kuntz's philosophy, but comes
to opposite result in fact); Comment, Surface or Mineral: A Single Test?, 23
407, 414 (1971) (Acker test does not apply Kuntz test).

BAYLOR

L.

REV

130. A problem previously addressed concerns whether substances such as tar sands and
oil shale fit into the list of substances that belong to the surface as a matter of law. See Dobray,

supra note 109, at i. Texas's rejection of ejusdem generis may indicate that it would be improper to engage in a comparison of the similarities between the disputed substance and sub-

stances in the list of exceptions. Since oil shale and tar sands are substances valuable in
themselves apart from the soil, they would fall within the general Kuntz rule and, therefore,
belong to the mineral estate owner. Interested parties would need to tailor their instrument to
avoid application of the general rule if that rule does not accord with their intent. This general

rule application would be more appropriate for the stability of land titles than broadening the
list of excepted substances on a case-by-case basis. This analysis also demonstrates why nearsurface coal and lignite should also be considered minerals. Those substances became valuable

only recently, which explains why earlier conveyances failed to mention them. In the author's
opinion, one should not view Reed H as holding that near-surface coal and lignite belong to
the surface owner as a matter of law, because the court in that case applied the surface destruction test, which Moser II subsequently overruled. See supra note 36 and accompnying text.
The addition of Reed HI to the list of cases establishing that certain substances belong to the
surface as a matter of law should be dismissed as obiter dictum. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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AN ARGUMENT FOR RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE
ORDINARY AND NATURAL MEANING TEST

In Moser II the Texas Supreme Court chose to rule prospectively
"[b]ecause of the extent of public reliance"' 13 on Reed II and Acker. The
court also rendered a prospective ruling "because of an inability to foresee a
coming change in the law." 132 A review of the principles that govern a
court's deciding whether to accord an overruling decision retrospective or
prospective effect reveals that the prospective ruling in Moser II was
unnecessary.
In 1932 the United States Supreme Court held that a state court has the
discretion to determine whether a decision will be given retrospective or prospective application.1 33 The Texas Supreme Court has noted that a supreme
court's decision is generally retrospective.' 34 Exceptions to this rule arise
depending upon "the extent of public reliance" and "the ability to foresee a
coming change in the law."' 135 The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the
Moser II rulings fell within the exceptions. 136 Extensive reliance, however,
on the surface destruction test appears inherently impossible for two reasons.
First, the supreme court revised the test two times after its formulation in
1971.137 Second, a court must make numerous factual determinations before
it can determine ownership. A title examiner, without these determinations,
does not know what minerals the parties conveyed in an "other minerals"
clause. The primary message of the surface destruction test, therefore, was
to warn the public to draft instruments clearly to avoid its application by
131.
132.
133.
that the

676 S.W.2d at 103.
Id.
See Great N.Y. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (1932). The Court held
Supreme Court of Montana possessed the right to limit prospectively its decision to

overrule a case dealing with shippers' rights upon reduction of interstate freight rates. Id. at
360-66.
134. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. 1983). This common law tradition
viewed the law as a "brooding omnipresence" and implied that judges did not make the law,
but found it. An overruling decision, therefore, signified not that the overruled decision "was
bad law, but that it was not law; that is, that it [was] not the established custom of the realm, as
[had] been erroneously determined." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 69-70 (1765). See Currier, Times and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective
Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201 (1965) (traces evolvement of theories on prospective and retrospective overruling). Today, the general rule remains unchanged, although the common law
basis has subsided. See Johnson v. McKaskle, 591 F. Supp. 511, 517 (S.D. Tex.), vacated on
unrelatederror, 727 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1984); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex.
1983); Oreland & Stebing, Retroactivity in Review. The Federal and Washington Approaches,
16 GONZ. L. REV. 855, 869 (1981); Note, Prospective Overrulingand Retroactive Application in
the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 909-16 (1962).
135. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. 1983); see also In re S/S Helena, 529
F.2d 744, 754 (5th Cir. 1976) (retroactive effect to be granted unless overriding equitable considerations); Johnson v. McKaskle, 591 F. Supp. 511, 515 (S.D. Tex.), vacated on unrelated
error, 727 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1984) (injunctive decree issued pursuant to class action presumed
retroactive); City of Farmers Branch v. Matushita Elec. Corp., 537 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex.)
(retrospective tax liability not inequitable), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
136. Moser II, 676 S.W.2d at 103.
137. Compare Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (first established surface
destruction test) with Reed II, 597 S.W.2d at 747 (modified Acker test and Reed I).
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expressing a specific intent. 38 A retrospective ruling would not affect individuals who heeded this warning.
The court's general rule and exceptions, espoused in Sanchez, are not the
only guidelines the court must consider in reaching a decision to rule retrospectively or prospectively. The United States Supreme Court listed the following guidelines in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson:139 (1) if the decision is to be
applied nonretroactively, it "must establish a new principle of law, either by
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed . . .";140 (2) the "merits and demerits" of each case must be
weighed "by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation"; 4 ' and (3) a decision should not be applied retroactively if it would
produce "substantial inequitable results."' 4 2 The Chevron guidelines have
provided the basis of numerous decisions, both civil and criminal, state and
federal. 4 3 When one applies these criteria to the Moser 11 rulings, a retrospective ruling appears appropriate. First, the decision in Moser II did not
overrule "clear past precedent." This conclusion is drawn from the unsettled state of the surface destruction test and the necessary factual determinations involved. The second and third Chevron guidelines involve a balancing
test: a court must weigh the purpose and history of the rule against any
inequitable results that retrospective operation would cause. In this instance, the purpose of the overruling decision was to instill certainty into
Texas land titles. 144 As the court noted in Moser 11, the history of the sur14 5
face destruction test revealed that it had devastated land title stability.
The post-Moser cases have demonstrated that the prospective ruling has
done little to remedy the contorted state of the law.' 46 On the other hand,
138. See Reed H, 597 S.W.2d at 751-52 (Spears, J., concurring). In commenting on the
possible reliance by parties on the surface destruction test, Justice Spears stated that "[tihe

only likely change in the conduct of surface owners who were aware of those decisions would
have been to specifically name iron, coal, and lignite in their grant or reservation and thus
remove any doubt about their intent." Id.
139. 404 U.S. 97 (1971) (construed application of statute of limitations for personal injury).

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 106 (citations omitted).
Id. at 106-07 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)).
Id. at 107.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 720 F.2d 857, 860 (5th Cir.) (civil case),

vacated, 462 U.S. 1127 (1983); Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692, 697 (5th Cir. 1981) (criminal
case); Williams v. Phil Rich Fan Mfg. Co., 552 F.2d 596, 598-600 (5th Cir. 1977) (federal

statute); Ex parte Hovermale, 636 S.W.2d 828, 835 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ)
(state court). In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965), the United States Supreme
Court found no distinction between civil and criminal litigation in reaching a decision regarding retrospective effect.
144. Moser HI, 676 S.W.2d at 101.

145. Id. The court stated that:
Application of this rule has required the determination of several fact issues to
establish whether the owner of the surface or the mineral estate owns a substance not specifically referred to in a grant, reservation or exception. As a re-

sult, it could not be determined from the [instrument] alone who owned title to
an unnamed substance.

Id. (citation omitted).
146. See supra notes 53-91 and accompanying text.
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retroactive operation of the Moser II rules would greatly promote the courts'
purpose.
A court should consider other factors in choosing to rule prospectively or
retrospectively. A court should not overrule rules of property retrospec147
tively, for example, unless there are other controlling considerations.

This rule reflects the protection accorded vested property rights.

48

On the

other hand, a change in a rule of construction is more susceptible to a retrospective application. 149 Rules formulated for interpretation of an "other
minerals" clause appear more closely akin to rules of construction than rules
of property. 150 Once again, due to the nature of the surface destruction test,

one cannot be certain that he has obtained a vested property right in a disputed substance until after the litigation of numerous factual questions.
Since one cannot determine ownership, title uncertainty results. It becomes

erroneous, therefore, to state that the surface destruction test conferred

vested property rights that warrant protection via a prospective ruling. 5 1
In an effort to protect those who may have relied on precedent, the court
allowed the surface destruction test to survive by overruling it prospec-

tively. 15 2 Ironically, the court's zealous concern for public reliance was absent in the Friedman opinion, in which the court ruled that the surface
147. See, e.g., Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 22 (Tex.
1978) (common law rule governing withdrawal of ground-water rule of property; therefore,

change in rules restricted to prospective application); Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 151 Tex. 324, 328, 249 S.W. 2d 914, 916 (1952) (decisions holding that lessors jointly
executing general form lease intend to unitize their properties had become rule of property not
to be changed absent "other controlling circumstances"); Davis v. First Nat'l Bank, 145
S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1940) (rule in Shelley's case was rule of property),
aff'd, 139 Tex. 36, 40, 161 S.W.2d 467, 470 (1942); Currier, supra note 134, at 242. Currier
states that "a change in property law fairly cries out for prospective overruling.... This is so
... because of the obviously great societal interest in stability in this area, in land titles, for
instance." Id. The justification in this instance does not apply since the court is overruling the
rule that has caused instability in land titles.
148. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16 (retroactive law prohibited when impairs obligation of
contracts); Dotson v. Fluor Corp., 492 F. Supp. 313, 315-16 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (amendments to
Texas long-arm statute could be given retrospective application since defendant's vested rights
not affected); Gonzalez v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 509 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. Civ.
App.- Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (judgment pending on appeal does not establish vested
rights that prevent retrospective ruling).
149. See Carter Oil Co. v. Weil, 209 Ark. 653, 192 S.W.2d 215, 219 (1946) (rule that
habendum clause contradicting granting clause must be rejected was merely rule of construction, not rule of property, and retroactive ruling was proper); Crow v. State, 147 Tex. Crim.
292, 296, 180 S.W.2d 354, 356 (1944) (change in construction of statute not limited to prospective effect). Courts will ascertain the intent of the parties through a rule of construction. Alternatively, a rule of property evidences a settled legal principle, which governs ownership of
property. R. PATTON & C. PATTON, PATTON ON TITLES § 529 at 404 n.78 (2d ed. 1957).
150. See MoserII, 676 S.W.2d at 101. The court reviewed "a number of construction aids"
Texas courts have considered in construing an "other minerals" clause, including ejusdem
generis, the ordinary and natural meaning test, and the surface destruction test. Id. at 101-02.
In Reed I the majority opinion referred to the Acker rule as a "rule of construction." 554
S.W.2d at 172. Similarly, in Schwarz II the supreme court referred to the surface destruction
test as a construction "device." 703 S.W.2d at 189 (surface destruction test not applicable
when another rule of construction applies).
151. Accord Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1984) (mineral owner's
expectations did not constitute property right).
152. Moser II, 676 S.W.2d at 103.
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destruction test applied to instruments executed before formulation of the
test. 15 3 This ruling will purge Texas law of some of the adverse effects of the
surface destruction test over a long period of time. 15 4 The importance of
any inequiachieving land title certainty immediately, however, outweighs
55
ties suffered by those who supposedly relied on the test.'
VI.

ACCOMMODATION OF ESTATES DOCTRINE AND
DAMAGES UNDER MOSER 11

The prospective limitation of Moser II to all severances and leases made
after June 8, 1983, also applies to the damages rules formulated in that case.
These rules are:
The limitation of the dominant mineral owner's liability to negligently
inflicted damages does not control in a case ...

of "other minerals."

When dealing with the rights of a mineral owner who has taken title by
a grant or reservation of an unnamed substance such as this, liability of
include compensation to the surface owner for
the mineral owner must
56
surface destruction.
The Moser 11 court emphasized that in both a specific grant of minerals and
a grant in an "other minerals" clause the dictates of the "due regard" or
"accommodation" doctrine restrict the mineral owner's use of the surface
estate.' 5 7 To understand the impact of this holding, a review of the law on
surface use and liability of the mineral estate owner will be helpful.
The mineral estate owner possesses the right to use so much of the land,
both surface and subsurface, as is reasonably necessary to comply with the
terms of the lease and to carry out the intentions of the parties. 158 The mineral estate owner may not use the surface or subsurface, however, in a negligent manner without liability to the surface owner for any negligently caused
damages. l5 9 A mineral owner, therefore, can be liable for (1) using more
land than reasonably necessary, or (2) using a reasonable amount of land,
153. See supra 54-55 and accompanying text.
154. As noted earlier in this article, courts may still use the surface destruction test for
near-surface lignite, iron, and coal since Moser II cited Reed for the proposition that these
substances belong to the surface as a matter of law. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
155. One author makes the following observation about the effect of replacing other rules

with Dean Kuntz's theory:
Its adoption might be disruptive to settled principles of law, but the impact on

property owners need not be substantial. Furthermore, constructive disruption
is one of the functions of our judicial system, and the short-term price would be
more than outweighed by the long-term certainty and stability that would
follow.
Lowe, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, 32 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N
117, 142 (1981) (footnote omitted).
156. Moser 11, 676 S.W.2d at 103 (footnote omitted).
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972) (mineral lessee
has implied right to use surface as necessary); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d
133, 134 (Tex. 1967) (lessee had right to use as much of premises as reasonably necessary);
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 469, 271 S.W.2d 410, 413 (1954) (dominant
estate had legal right to use premises as reasonably necessary).
159. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. 1967).
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but doing so in a negligent manner. 160
The Texas Supreme Court applies the due regard concept as an aid in
161
In Getty Oil Co. v. Jones162
deciding what constitutes a reasonable use.
the mineral lessee could not interfere with the surface owner's preexisting
163
irrigation system when a reasonable alternative existed on the property.
If no reasonable alternatives exist on the property, however, as in Sun Oil
Co. v. Whitaker,' 64 a court will deem a lessee's use reasonable even if it ren165
ders the surface virtually worthless.
The due regard or accommodation of estates doctrine developed from
cases in which substance ownership was not in dispute.1 66 Unfortunately,
the Acker court announced a new rule, which changed substance ownership,
rather than following the logic embodied in the accommodation of estates
doctrine, which compensates the surface owner for the extra burden on his
estate. 167 After Moser II, however, the theories behind both rules stand unified: courts will no longer use the surface destruction test to determine substance ownership. The mineral owner, however, can only make reasonable
use of the surface. The question then becomes: Is a method of extraction
that destroys the surface, such as strip mining, a reasonable use? Due to the
statutes regulating strip mining 68 and Texas's constitutional mandate en160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 815-16 (Tex. 1974) (reasonable for oil company to use gas field for storage); Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501
S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. 1973) (not reasonable for lessee to use water to benefit other tracts);
Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971) (not reasonable for lessee exclusively
to use superadjacent air).
162. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).

163. Id. at 622.
164. 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972).
165. Id. at 812. In Whitaker the lessee used fresh water from the tract for its waterflood
program. The jury found that this use would "materially affect" the surface owner's ability to
produce water for irrigation purposes. Id. The court upheld the use and said, "To hold that
Sun can be required to purchase water from other sources or owners of other tracts in the area,
would be in derogation of the dominant estate." Id. The court distinguished Getty on the
basis that in Getty reasonable alternatives "on the leased premises" existed. Id.
166. See, e.g., Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. 1973)
(surface owner brought suit for wrongful taking of salt water in oil production); Sun Oil Co. v.
Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d at 810 (controversy regarding use of water in oil production); Getty Oil
Co. v Jones, 470 S.W.2d at 622 (surface owner brought suit to enjoin lessee from using vertical
air space for oil and gas production).
167. Compare Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (established surface destruction test in 1971 for deciding ownership disputes between surface and mineral owners)
with Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d at 622 (used due regard concept to determine if
lessee's use was reasonable).
168. See Texas Uranium Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 131.001-.305 (Vernon Supp. 1987); Texas Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act,
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-11 (Vernon Supp. 1987). The Uranium Surface Mining
Act contains a policy statement, which states that reclamation will permit the mining of valuable minerals "in a manner designed for the protection and subsequent beneficial use of land."
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 131.002(7) (Vernon Supp. 1987). The Coal Mining and Reclamation Act provides that one of the purposes of the Act is "to assure that the coal supply
essential to the state's energy requirements and to its economic and social well-being is provided, and to strike a balance between protection of the environment and agricultural productivity and the state's need for coal as an essential source of energy." TEX. REV. CiV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5920-11, § 2(5)(E) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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couraging the exploration of natural resources, 169 courts should consider
strip mining a reasonable use in general. 170 If acceptable alternatives are
available in a specific case, however, the courts could correctly hold the mineral owner liable for strip mining as using more land than is reasonably
necessary.
The previous limitation to recovering damages for using more land than
reasonably necessary or for using a reasonable amount negligently is expanded under Moser II to impose absolute liability for any surface damage
when the grantor conveyed the mineral at issue in an "other minerals"
clause, rather than in a specific grant. 17 1 The justification is that a court

would have considered surface damage if the grantor had specifically
granted the substance, and the agreed-upon price would reflect the surface

damage. 172 If the mineral owner is mining an unspecified mineral, however,
the parties most likely did not consider resulting surface damage in striking
73
the bargain. 1
The goal of the court in Moser II was to use damages, rather than the
surface destruction test, to protect the surface owner. Once the court decides

that damages should be paid, it is not clear what these damages should be.
The opinion specifically states that its holding will not affect the statutory

duties of mineral owners to restore the surface under the reclamation statutes. 174 The difference in the fair market value of the land before and after
mining and reclamation would often not fully compensate the surface owner

since the value could be the same before strip mining and after reclamation.
The mineral estate owner should compensate the surface owner, therefore,
for the time during which he is deprived of175the use of the land through
recovery of lost rental values or lost profits.

169. See TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 59. The article provides that "[t]he conservation and
development of all of the natural resources of this State... and the preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public rights and
duties ...." Id. § 59(a).
170. Other authors have also concluded that courts should consider strip mining a reasonable use under the accommodation of estates doctrine. See Broyles supra note 123, at 472;
Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral, supra note 10, at 308.
171. Moser II, 676 S.W.2d at 103.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 103 n.4.
175. See Lowe, What Substances are Minerals?, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
§ 2.05[2][c] (1984). The author thinks that the eminent domain cases provide an analogy and
that, therefore, the damages should be the difference between the fair market value of the land
before stripping and after reclamation, plus compensation for the deprivation of the use of the
land. Id. § 2.33. If one adheres to this analogy, then courts would not allow lost profits as a
separate item of damages. See State v. Travis, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 144, 144 (Jan. 17, 1987)
(evidence of lost profits not admissible in condemnation suits). One author has gone further
and suggested that the surface owner should also be compensated for his cooperation in obtaining the necessary mining and reclamation permits. See Laity, supra note 44, at 197 n.20.
The Texas Legislature may need to follow the lead of other jurisdictions and enact a statute
governing the damages issue. See N.D. CENT.CODE § 38-11.1-04 (Interim Supp. 1987); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 318.2-.9 (West Supp. 1987).
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CONCLUSION

Many states are blessed with the presence of valuable substances beneath
their soils. Other jurisdictions should closely heed the Texas experience.
The surface destruction test produced a title examiner's nightmare. The
Texas Supreme Court attempted to rectify the situation in Moser IL That
opinion did not go far enough, however. Instead, the deficiencies in Moser II
have caused the current state of Texas law on "oil, gas, and other minerals"
clauses to resemble a confusing dialogue between two comedians. This fact
is tragic, rather than comic.
The Texas Supreme Court needs to determine once and for all "who owns
what," and "what is what" so that title examiners and other interested parties can stop exclaiming "I don't know." The court can accomplish this goal
by adopting the Kuntz test and exceptions as the ordinary and natural
meaning test. This approach satisfies Texas precedent and will go further to
promote land title stability than a test that requires outside testimony regarding the meaning of words. The court should apply this ordinary and
natural meaning test retroactively in order to eradicate totally the adverse
effects of the surface destruction test. A retroactive ruling would also permit
the supreme court to stress the importance of the reclamation statutes. Further, the special rules for the state and royalty owners would be unnecessary.
Most importantly, however, the Texas Supreme Court would achieve its goal
of instilling certainty in Texas land titles.

